Furthermore, we show the dynamic paths if the economy goes from its feedback to its open-loop steady state.
ZNTRODUCTION
In this paper we focus on the problem of the trade-off between investment behaviour of the firm and the tax policy of a'rational' government. The government may announce a relatively low corporate tax rate, resulting in a lower level of public consumption than preferred by consumers. But this relatively low tax rate also implies a higher level of investment, which generates a higher level of total consumption in the future. In this paper we model this dynamic trade-off between corporation taxation now and in the future within a macro-economic framework.
The question of optimal taxation is a very broad one and many strands of literature can be identified, see for example Ramsey (192~) , Sandmo (19~6), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) , Laffer (1981) . The first distinction can be made between papers, which deal with this problem in a static framework (e.g. Ramsey (192~) and Laffer (1981) ) or in a dynamic way (e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1980) , Turnovsky and Brock (1980) ). In this paper we deal with the problem of optimal dynamic taxation. We can also distinguish between different kinds of tax rates, e.g. sales tax, wage or income tax and profit tax. In the literature most interest has been paid to the problem of optimal static income tax, because of its impact on the supply and demand for labour (e.g. Laffer (1981) 
where: b: rate of depreciation.
The necessary conditions for the firm's optimal control problem are:l
fl -w~(5)
in which: q: the (undiscounted) shadow price of capital.
If we assume that f(k,l) is a Cobb-Douglas production function2 and that wages are constant, then labour is a linear function of capital and the
1)
To be precise, we have to distinguish between open-loop and feedback information structure for the firm. However, if we will see in appendix 2 and 3 for an economy with many firms this makes no difference.
2)
To obtain analytical results we specify the production function as a Cobb-Douglas function. However, we think the whole derivation also holds for other production functions. 9 -(r'ó)q -a(1-T).
i -~(q).~r~o,~(1)-0.
1 -hk,
í8)
( 10) where a and h are positive constants.
With respect to fixed wages we can assume that there is some union power, that ensures wages to be equal to some fixed level w(e.g.
Oswald (1985)).
It is also possible to model a labour market, where w is determíned by supply and demand for labour (e.g. Abel and Blanchard (1983) ). In that case there may be full employment. So if the corporate tax rate raises, capital formation decreases and there will be less employment.
THE CONSUMER'S DECISION PROBLEM
In this section we model the saving-investment decision, similar to Abel and Blanchard (1983) or Van de Klundert and Peters (1986) for example. The consumer can choose between consumption now or in the future given his income from labour, dividend and interest. In this way consumption is an increasing function of total wealth in the spirit of Metzler (1951) and an equilibrium between aggregate demand and supply is achieved by the endogenous adjustment of the sequence of current and future interest rates. We assume that the consumer takes the decision of the firm and the government as given. Furthermore, the consumer maximises a concave uLility function, which depends on private and public consumption.
The consumer chooses a path of consumption, which maximises the present value of utilíty over time 
So income is the sum of wages, interest on savings and dividends. The current-value Hamiltonian for this problem is H-u(c,g) t x(rb t wl t n-c).
The optimality conditions are:
uc -x.
x -(g-r)x, lim e-~tb(t) -0,
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in which: x: the costate variable associated with the dynamic budget constraint.
To exclude paths from borrowing forever we assume that there are No-Ponzi- Abel and Blanchard (1983, pp. 680-681) ).
OPEN-LOOP STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIA
We assume that the government has the same utility function as the consumer (cf. Turnovsky and Brock (1980) ), that public consumption will be financed from profit taxation and that there ís no debt. As already noted in section 1, an important difference between government and firm or consumer is that the government takes account of the manner in which the firm and consumer react on its taxation decisions, while the firm and the consumer take the taxation decision as given. So the formal outcome of the game corresponds to a three person Stackelberg game with the government as leader and firm and consumer playing Nash against each other. 
uc -x' (23)
b-rb t rr t wl -c.
Note that equation (21) represents the equilibrium on the goods market and that equation (22) 
c -{1-T}ak t whk -~(q)-p(~(q)), (27) g -Tak.
(28)
It should be noted that we can eliminate b and x. Substituting from (21) into (23) gives us a value for x. As already stated the stream of consumption will not be influenced by financial streams.
The maximisation of (18) with respect to (19)-(25) yields, by assuming an interior solution, the followíng necessary conditions:
where: a: the government's undiscounted marginal value of capital stock, v: the government's undiscounted marginal value of the shadow price of the capital stock to the firm (-q).
The Hamiltonian is defined by
9
Together with the condition for the equilibrium in the goods market
we have a complete macro-economic model, which is repeated in appendix 1.
The model has 13 equations and 13 unknown variables and can be solved by the method of multiple shooting as explained in Lipton et al. (1982) . Note that the condition for the equilibrium in the goods market, together with tlie anticipation that this condition will hold at future times, determines at any instant the complete term structure of interest rates.
In the steady-state the rate of interest equals the social discount rate and personal savings are zero.
From equations (27), (28) and (29) we can derive:
It should be noted, that the optimal tax rate will be chosen in such a way, that the following equation holds, along the equilibrium path (cf.
(29)):
The steady-state follows from eqs. (30) and (31) 
So in the steady-state the amount of public consumption in total consumption is less than 1-a (cf. (35). (36)). Due to equations (12), (27),
and (37), the optimal tax rate in the steady-state can be derived:
. . .
T -T(k ,v ,q ). (3~)
3) assuming that~~'-(a~c){q~'})0, which is quite reasonable. Equation (29) So if the firm has no reason to believe that the government will stick to its initial plan, the concept used in the previous section, which
corresponds to an open-loop equilibrium of a Stackelberg game, is no longer a useful concept.
In the literature three main streams can be qualified for solving the problem of time-inconsistency. The first attempt is what is called the loss of leadership (cf. Buiter (1983) Backus and Driffill (1985) , Barro and Gordon (1983) Haurie, Ricci (1985) , Van der Ploeg and De Zeeuw (1989) ). In the appendices 2 and 3 the derivation is given for the model presented in section 2, 3 and 4. It is shown that the outcome depends on the number of firms in the economy. Therefore, we distinguish between two cases. In the first case there are many identical firms and all firms are very small. In the second case there is only one firm.
If there are many firms we are able to prove that the open-loop Nash equilibrium is a candidate for the feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium, where the Nash equilibrium effectively sets v(t)-0 for t~0 and ignores (19). The reason for this is that the firm is so small that the information about the way that the tax rate depends on the capital stock yields no advantage, because it can not influence it. The Nash equilibrium is time-consistent, because v(t)-0 for t) 0 implies time-consistency (cf.
Pohjola (1986)). The open-loop Nash solution is easy to calculate and it turns out that the optimal tax rate is given by (39)).
[insert (see  table  1 ), but at the moment that the capital stock is built up, there is an incentive for the government to reoptimise and ask a higher tax rate. The firm's outcome is, of course, lower, if the government cheats the firm by suddenly asking the high rate instead of sticking to its announced plan.
Therefore, a tíme-inconsistent plan requires binding commitments to force the government to stick to its announced tax strategy.
The nature of the solutions examined may be further clarified by a numerical example, which is based on the following two assumptions:
(i) quadratic adjustment costs:
(ii) CD-production function: [insert 4) This system satisfies the saddle point property of a perfect-foresight system, since there are three stable and three unstable eigenvalues (cf., Buiter (1984) 
